Spatial dependence in asylum migration by Barthel, Fabian & Neumayer, Eric
  
Fabian Barthel and Eric Neumayer  
Spatial dependence in asylum migration 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: Barthel, Fabian and Neumayer, Eric (2015) Spatial dependence in asylum migration. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41 (7). pp. 1131-1151. ISSN 1369-183X  
DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2014.967756 
 
 
© 2014 Taylor & Francis  
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64187/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or 
other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research 
Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further 
distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may 
freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you 
wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 Spatial Dependence in Asylum Migration 
 
Published in: 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41 (7), 2015, pp. 1131-1151 
 
 
Fabian Barthel and Eric Neumayer

 
 
Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics (LSE), Houghton 
Street, London WC2A 2AE, U.K. 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7412 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7598 
 
 
 
 
Key words: migration; migrant networks; asylum policy; externalities; spatial dependence 
JEL classification: F22, J15, K37 
                                                          

 Corresponding author (email: e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk).  
2 
 
1 
 
Abstract 
Existing refugees in a destination country from the same source country reduce the uncertainty 
faced by subsequent asylum migrants since existing refugees can provide information and 
assistance. We argue that such network effects extend beyond the borders of specific source 
countries. Potential asylum migrants might also be able to draw on networks from geographically 
proximate as well as linguistically similar countries and from countries having previously been 
colonized by the same destination country, thus creating spatial dependence in asylum migration 
among source countries. Many destination countries meanwhile aspire to reduce the inflow of 
migrants by tightening their asylum policies. Target countries which restrict their policies 
relatively more than other destinations deflect some asylum migrants to geographically 
proximate destination countries, thus creating spatial dependence among target countries. We 
find evidence for both types of spatial dependence in our global analysis of asylum migration. 
However, while statistically significant, the degree of spatial dependence among target countries 
is modest. On the source side, there is evidence for modest spatial dependence among 
linguistically similar countries and no evidence for spatial dependence among countries which 
were previously colonized by the same destination country. By contrast, we find substantial 
spatial dependence among geographically proximate source countries. 
2 
1. Introduction 
Even though the number of asylum applications in developed countries has declined steadily 
since the early 1990s, many destination countries have successively restricted their asylum 
migration policies with the aim of reducing the number of asylum migrants. Such restrictions 
create “negative”1 externalities – if one country deters refugees by curtailing welfare benefits, a 
tighter visa regime or lower recognition rates, higher application numbers in other destination 
countries are likely to be the consequence (Brochmann 1995; Böcker and Havinga 1998; Suhrke 
1998; Rotte et al. 1997; Hatton 2004).
2
 This externality-induced deflection leads to political 
tensions among destination countries. 
In addition to negative externalities created by restrictive policies among destination countries, 
there are also potential spill-over effects of asylum migration among source countries. Asylum 
migration is fraught with uncertainties and the existence of migrant networks reduces uncertainty 
to potential migrants (Massey 1990; Rotte et al.1997, McKenzie and Rapoport 2007; Hatton 
2009; Beine et al. 2011). We argue in this article that such networks are likely to extend beyond 
the boundaries of a single source country. Instead, potential migrants can also draw on networks 
consisting of migrants from geographically proximate, linguistically similar or other source 
countries that were colonized by the same destination country. In other words, asylum migration 
creates positive externalities among “close” source countries as well, creating benefits to 
                                                          
1
 Negative in the sense that one destination country deflects predominantly unwanted migrants onto another 
destination country. Even for “genuine refugees”, destination countries generally prefer if another destination 
country shoulders the burden of accommodating the refugees. 
2
 The terms “source country” and “country of origin” and, respectively, “target country” and “destination country” 
are used synonymously. 
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potential asylum migrants from these other source countries rendering their decision to file for 
asylum in a given target country more likely. 
Both types of externalities – the negative externalities among target countries and the positive 
externalities among source countries – create what is known as spatial dependence in 
international asylum migration flows. Apart from some anecdotal evidence in qualitative studies, 
this aspect of asylum migration has been neglected in the existing literature. To our knowledge, 
Rotte et al. (1997) and Hatton (2004) are the only studies explicitly addressing spatial 
dependence in asylum migration. However, even these studies look at the effect of foreign 
asylum policy and foreign economic variables on domestic asylum applications rather than at 
spatial dependence in asylum flows directly. Our analysis fills this gap. Specifically, we are the 
first to provide systematic evidence for spatial dependence among both source countries and 
among target nations, employing a dyadic study based on a large sample of both source countries 
(153) and target countries (19).  
While much of our argument and reasoning would apply to non-asylum migration and related 
policies as well, asylum migration represents a very significant part of inward migration from 
developing to developed countries. It is also the aspect of migration which is much better 
documented and for which reasonably good data exist since asylum migrants are officially 
registered with the destination country authorities. We focus on asylum migration to developed 
countries due to data constraints on refugee flows into developing countries. This should not 
distract from the fact that most refugee flows are from developing countries to other, typically 
nearby, developing countries as geographical proximity reduces transportation costs and refugees 
may also prefer to stay close by in the hope of returning home one day. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we explain what factors are 
likely to cause spatial dependence in asylum migration. Section 3 describes in detail the 
4 
empirical research design. Section 4 presents results, section 5 concludes with policy 
implications of the analysis. 
2. Spatial Dependence in Asylum Migration Flows 
This section argues why spatial dependence likely exists in international asylum migration flows 
both among target as well as among source countries. We do not address the general factors 
influencing a potential asylum migrant’s decision to leave or not. Instead, we only discuss factors 
of relevance to spatial dependence. 
While our analysis of spatial dependence in asylum migration provides an original contribution 
and fills a clear gap in the extant literature, it fits into an increasing trend toward an analysis of 
spatial dependence and contagion effects in transnational and international interactions (see, for 
example, Solingen 2012 and Zhukov and Stewart 2013). There has been specific focus on 
geographical contagion effects in state failure and political unrest (Iqbal and Starr 2008) as well 
as civil wars and their links to movements of refugees from one developing country to another 
(see, for example, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). To the extent that such geographical contagion 
effects co-generate additional drivers of asylum migration in geographically proximate source 
countries, they represent another reason for specific source contagion in asylum migration 
beyond the social network and people smuggling network effects discussed further below. The 
reason for not discussing this additional reason for spatial dependence among source in more 
detail is that if such geographical contagion merely exacerbates asylum migration push factors in 
certain source countries in general without mapping onto particular source-destination country 
dyads, then these will be fully absorbed by the source specific year fixed effects in our research 
design (see next section for more details). 
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Asylum migration is an example of a dyadic phenomenon, which involves a flow (here: of 
people) between two countries. More specifically, it is a directed dyadic phenomenon where the 
flow originates in the source country of the migrant i and is directed to the destination country j. 
Authors (2010) provide a categorisation of all possible forms of spatial dependence in such 
dyadic data. In the context of international asylum migration the two relevant forms are so-called 
specific source contagion and specific target contagion. Specific source contagion means that the 
number of asylum seekers from source i to target j partly depends on the weighted number of 
asylum seekers from other sources k to the very same destination country j, whereas specific 
target contagion exists if the number of applicants from source i to target j depends on the 
weighted number of asylum seekers from the same source country i to other targets m. For 
example, with specific source contagion, the number of asylum seekers from Ghana in the UK 
would partly depend on the number of asylum seekers from, say, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire in the 
UK. With specific target contagion, the number of Ghanaian asylum seekers in the UK partly 
depends on the number of applications from Ghana in, say, France and Ireland. In the following, 
we provide theoretical reasons why one would expect both specific source and specific target 
contagion in asylum migration flows. 
2.1 Spatial Dependence among Source Countries 
A potential asylum migrant must weigh the costs and benefits of staying in her country against 
the costs and benefits of leaving and filing an application for asylum in the destination country. 
This decision is subject to given constraints such as limited financial resources for and other 
restrictions on travelling and very imperfect knowledge about the costs and benefits of staying 
and migrating. One also has to bear in mind that many asylum seekers make their decision under 
great pressure, enormous uncertainty about costs and benefits and might not be able to fully 
balance the costs and benefits of their migration decisions (Author). 
6 
The benefits of migration are fairly straightforward: escaping whatever reason renders leaving 
the country of origin unattractive. Turning to the costs of migration, many migrants will have to 
rely on people smugglers because they can only file an asylum application from within the target 
country and destination countries are keen to impede access for potential asylum seekers by 
imposing visa restrictions (Author; Jandl 2004). At least as important – though much harder to 
quantify – are however the social costs of migration, since one has to leave the familiar 
environment, friends and relatives behind and adapt to an unknown surrounding. This might not 
only entail a new language, but also a different culture. 
Additional costs occur if asylum seekers are not welcome in the target country. This is 
particularly relevant if resentments against foreigners express themselves in violent acts or public 
demonstrations. Finally, asylum policy and welfare provisions in the destination countries 
influence the costs of migration (Robinson and Segrott 2002). While generous social benefits and 
work permits for asylum seekers lower the costs, restricted access to employment and to benefit 
entitlements and compulsory accommodation in isolated reception centres increase both the costs 
and the risks of seeking asylum. Low recognition rates for asylum seekers in the past indicate a 
tough stance in the target country and are associated with a higher risk of rejection which in turn 
increases the costs of migration. 
Potential asylum migrants thus face significant uncertainty and lack of knowledge and support 
when they file for asylum in a potential destination country. One factor mitigating uncertainty 
and lack of knowledge and support that has been stressed by many (e.g., Rotte et al.1997, 
Author, Thielemann 2004, 2006a, Hatton 2009) is the existence of “migrant networks” (Massey 
1990). As network theory suggests, a higher number of past migrants from the same country 
reduces information, assimilation and transaction costs for potential subsequent migrants and 
makes migration more likely (Rotte et al. 1997). Such networks consist of personal relationships 
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with already existing migrants, with which the potential migrant can establish some relationship. 
These personal networks help to gain a foothold in the target country by assisting the search for 
accommodation and employment as well as a sense of belonging and the chance to uphold the 
cultural habits within the diaspora community. Individuals who migrated earlier could also be a 
role-model for potential migrants and their experience with selecting people smugglers and 
obtaining visas might help to reduce the uncertainty (Author). 
The importance of these networks as a determinant of the size of bilateral asylum flows is well 
documented in the empirical literature (e.g., Rotte et al. 1997, Vogler and Rotte 2000, Author, 
Hatton 2004, 2009). However, scholars typically assume that these network effects only exist for 
migrants from the very same country of origin as the asylum seeker, even though Beine et al. 
(2011: 10) note that “restricting the diaspora to people with the same nationality might be 
restrictive”. Specific source contagion derives from the fact that such migrant networks are not 
necessarily exclusively restricted to the very same country, but can cut across source country 
borders. The presence of migrants with a similar cultural background facilitates asylum 
migration and this similarity is not limited to fellow countrymen as migrant networks do not 
necessarily correspond to national borders (Beine et al. 2011). For instance, if there is not only a 
Ghanaian community but a West African community in the UK which supports individual 
asylum seekers from the region, more migrants from Togo and Côte d’Ivoire in the UK should 
reduce the risk and costs of migrating from Ghana and therefore foster asylum seeking by 
Ghanaians in the UK. One would expect, however, that these network effects decay relatively 
quickly with increasing distance between two source countries. 
Another reason for spatial dependence among geographically proximate source countries is that 
people smuggling networks may draw in potential asylum migrants from other nearby countries. 
That asylum and other migrants often depend on people smugglers is well documented (Van 
8 
Moppes 2006). There are well established smuggling routes from Central and Northern Africa as 
well as the Middle East to Europe, with other routes bringing in asylum migrants from Asia 
(International Organization for Migration 2000; UNODC 2011). The joint use of trafficking 
routes by asylum migrants from geographically proximate source countries is also corroborated 
by the presence of nationals of such proximate countries on the refugee boats that frequently land 
at the shores of the Canary Islands, Lampedusa or Malta (International Herald Tribune 2011). 
Network effects could also be based on the sharing of the same language between immigrants 
rather than being geographically determined, however. For example, it could well be that the 
existence of a Francophone community is important instead of or in addition to the existence of a 
West African community. A shared language can facilitate the exchange of information and 
support among potential asylum applicants. If it is a common language with other immigrants 
which facilitates integration in the target country, then network effects should not decrease over 
distance between the source countries, e.g., migrants from Haiti in the UK provide the same 
benefit for asylum seekers from Senegal as do migrants from Guinea. 
A shared language will often be the result of having been previously colonized by the same 
colonizer whose language is shared. However, a shared colonial experience can also potentially 
create very specific network effects, namely specifically so for migration routes to the same 
previous common colonizing destination country. In other words, if specific source contagion 
were based on previously shared colonial experience rather than shared language, then it should 
be restricted to the previous colonizer as destination country. For example, the shared historical 
experience of former French colonies in East Africa should result in spatial dependence among 
them and other former French colonies with respect to asylum migration to France only, not to 
other potential destination countries. 
The above discussion leads to our first three testable hypotheses: 
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H1: An increase in asylum migrants to a specific destination country j from other source 
countries geographically proximate to source country i increases the number of asylum migrants 
from source country i to this same destination country. 
H2: An increase in asylum migrants to a specific destination country j from other source 
countries in which the same language is spoken increases the number of asylum migrants from 
source country i to this same destination country. 
H3: An increase in asylum migrants from other source countries to a specific destination country 
j that was a previous colonizer of these source countries increases the number of asylum 
migrants from source country i to this same destination country if country i has also been 
previously colonized by j. 
 
2.2 Spatial Dependence among Destination Countries 
Much public and media attention has focused on the costs of granting asylum to the destination 
countries. First and foremost, there are the fiscal costs of hosting asylum seekers. Further costs 
derive from efforts to integrate and help assimilate accepted asylum seekers. Yet, asylum 
migrants can remain a burden for the social systems even after they have been accepted and 
granted work permits since their education and skills might not allow them full job market 
participation. This might be because the qualifications are not recognised, documentation is 
inadequate or because of a lacking command of the target country language (Hatton 2004). 
However, not only monetary costs occur as a consequence of a large influx of asylum seeking 
migrants since xenophobia might foster anti-immigrant public opinion and support for populist 
right-wing political parties as citizens may worry that immigrants threaten their national, ethnic 
and cultural identities. These resentments could result in tensions and threaten internal peace. 
10 
Specific target contagion stems from the well-known problem of collective action where target 
countries opt for free-riding at the expense of other target nations in terms of providing asylum 
for refugees. As argued by Suhrke (1998), refugee protection has characteristics of an 
international public good. Western policy makers can use a multitude of policy levers to render 
their country less attractive for asylum seekers, such as restrictions on welfare benefits and 
employment opportunities, increasing the risk of being rejected due to low recognition rates, 
providing limited opportunities for appealing against a decision and raising the threat of forced 
removal.  
Hailbronner (2000), Schuster (2000), Zetter et al. (2003), Thielemann (2004), Gibney and 
Hansen (2005), and Hatton (2004, 2009) provide comprehensive overviews of asylum policies in 
developed nations.
3
 Here we briefly summarize the most important developments. Since the mid-
1980s and particularly since the mass influx of asylum seekers into Western Europe in the early 
1990s, some destination countries increasingly sought to restrict access to their territory in the 
form of visa requirements, restrictions on the possibility to apply for asylum from abroad, the 
strictness of border controls and the designation of airports as international zones (Hatton 2009). 
Also, penalties for agents who smuggle individuals into the country and for carriers by land, sea 
and air of undocumented arrivals fall into this category (Gibney and Hansen 2005). 
The second group of policy measures includes the definition of a refugee, the speed of 
processing the application and the possibility to appeal against a decision. Another example of 
policy measures which influence the determination of status is the designation of countries as 
“safe third countries” or “safe countries of origin” (Author). This safe country concept was an 
integral part of the Dublin Convention, which became effective in 1997 and was signed by many 
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 There have also been efforts at multilateral policy coordination at the EU level. We discuss the challenges such 
policy harmonisation poses for our analysis on spatial dependence in the next section. 
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Western European countries. However, it already had been widely applied before by many 
countries and asylum was denied for migrants who originated from or travelled through such a 
“safe country”. 
Finally, the welfare conditions of asylum seekers are determined by the extent to which they are 
allowed to work in the target country, whether the benefits are granted in cash or in-kind, 
whether they are free to choose their place of living or they are allocated to detention camps. In 
addition, the possibility of family reunification after a successful application and the chances of 
being deported after an unsuccessful application impact on the welfare of asylum migrants. 
Limitations on employment are a frequently used tool to protect the domestic labour market and 
to discourage economic migrants trying to exploit the asylum system. For instance, France 
withdrew the permission to work for asylum seekers in 1991, Germany followed suit in 1997 and 
the United Kingdom in 2002. While some countries, for example Germany and Belgium, provide 
benefits to asylum seekers in-kind rather than cash payments, others such as the United States, 
France, and Italy entitle asylum seekers to fewer welfare benefits than permanent residents or 
entitlement is subject to stricter conditions (Gibney and Hansen 2005). Also housing asylum 
applicants in detention centres is a measure to make a target country relatively less attractive. 
Often, these centres are located far away from major cities. The UK introduced a nation-wide 
dispersal system for asylum seekers in 2000 to stem the concentration of asylum seekers in 
certain metropolitan areas (Thielemann 2004).  
If asylum seekers react to more restrictive policy changes, the number of applications lodged in 
this specific destination country will decrease. But if refugees are not fully discouraged to leave 
their country and instead seek asylum elsewhere, then asylum policy becoming relatively more 
restrictive in one destination creates negative externalities for other potential destination 
countries as some of the flows that would have come to the country which becomes relatively 
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more restrictive now go to other destination countries. These externalities imply spatial 
dependence among destination countries. 
To which country asylum flows are deflected depends on which countries are regarded as 
substitutes from an asylum seeker’s point of view. In general, asylum seekers could be 
incentivised to lodge their asylum application in any country that becomes relatively more 
lenient. This is very unlikely, however. Asylum seekers prefer certain destination countries over 
others and simply because Spain has become relatively more restrictive than Sweden does not 
mean that the two destination countries spatially depend on each other. Böcker and Havinga 
(1998: 263) seem to suggest that spatial dependence affects only geographically contiguous 
destination countries: “[...] the introduction of measures to reduce the influx in one country may 
produce rising numbers in neighbouring countries”. There is some anecdotal evidence for this 
(Brochmann 1995; Böcker and Havinga 1998; Rotte et al. 1997; Holzer et al. 2000; Collyer 
2005). Yet, it seems too restrictive to assume that asylum policies of other destination countries 
only matter if the two countries are directly geographically contiguous. Geographical proximity 
clearly does matter, but the influence of other destination countries does not abruptly end with 
contiguous neighbours. In our empirical design, we will therefore model spatial dependence 
among target countries as a function of changes in the relative restrictiveness of asylum policies 
and geographical proximity, with the influence of destination countries further away rapidly 
decreasing with increasing distance. This results in our fourth and fifth hypotheses: 
H4: A decrease in asylum migrants to other geographically proximate destinations whose asylum 
policies have become relatively more restrictive than that of destination country j increases 
asylum migrants from source country i to destination country j. 
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H5: An increase in asylum migrants to other geographically proximate destinations whose 
asylum policies have become relatively less restrictive than that of destination country j 
decreases asylum migrants from source country i to destination country j. 
3. Data and methodology 
The dependent variable and sample 
The dependent variable is the annual number of asylum applications lodged by nationals of 
source country i in target country j, i.e. the observational unit is a country-pair (dyad) year. Data 
is provided by UNHCR (2011), based on information reported by national governments of 
destination countries. An asylum seeker is a person who has filed an application for asylum, but 
who has not yet received a final decision on his or her application. The figures generally refer to 
the number of applicants or persons rather than the number of applications or families and only 
cover first-instance applications, i.e. they exclude repeat or appeal applications. Furthermore, 
only persons who officially lodged an application are considered. Hence, refugees who were not 
able or unwilling to apply for asylum are not covered. Missing information is set to zero, which 
is reasonable since there will be either no asylum seekers in this particular dyad year or the 
number is so small as to be unrecorded.  
Following the example of Hatton (2009), to reduce the skewness of the data and to mitigate the 
influence of large values, the log of the annual number of asylum seekers is taken.
4
 Estimating a 
count dependent variable transformed via the natural log with a linear estimation model typically 
produces results that are very close to estimating a count data non-linear regression model such 
as Poisson or Negative Binomial, but is easier to handle and estimate, particularly given the very 
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 The value of one was added to all values before taking the logarithm. 
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large number of dyad fixed effects and destination- and source-specific year fixed effects 
included in the model (see below on model specification and estimation technique).  
Our estimation sample includes 19 target countries, as listed in appendix 1, for which Hatton 
(2009) provides an index of asylum policy changes, and 153 source countries, as listed in 
appendix 2, over the period 1998 to 2007. The set of destination countries consists of all major 
Western European countries, other large developed countries (Australia, Canada, and the United 
States) as well as three Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).  
Figure 1 displays the annual number of asylum seekers in destination countries since 1980. The 
number of applications increased steadily since 1983 and reached its maximum in 1992 with 
more than 800,000 applications. This surge is mostly due to a large number of refugees as a 
result of the war in former Yugoslavia, with most of them seeking asylum in Germany and 
Sweden. The numbers in industrialised countries since then have declined steadily and reached 
the 1988 level of around 300,000 applications in the latest years. We will control for these ups 
and downs with source- and destination-specific year fixed effects (see below) in order to ensure 
that the results on the spatial lag variables, to which we turn now, do not spuriously pick up these 
effects. 
 
The Spatial Lag Variables 
To analyse whether the number of asylum seekers from (to) a given source (target) country, 
depends on the number of asylum seekers in other source (target) countries, spatial 
autoregressive models are estimated. In such a model, the dependent variable for other 
observations, weighted by a connectivity variable, is included as an explanatory variable. The 
connectivity between countries is represented by a weighting matrix, in which each cell indicates 
the relationship either between two source countries or two target countries. The dependent 
15 
variable is then multiplied with the row-standardized weighting matrix to obtain the spatial lag 
variable. 
The weighting matrices for specific source contagion are derived from the theoretical discussion 
in Section 2: 
 Inverse distance: Other source countries are modelled to exert spatial dependence as a 
decreasing function of the geographical distance between them. Since similarity that 
could give rise to migrant networks is bound to decrease quickly with geographical 
distance, each cell contains inverse distance calculated as 1/distance², where squaring the 
denominator makes the effect decay quickly with increasing distance. The distance 
measure taken is the population centre weighted distance between two countries 
described in Mayer and Zignago (2006). 
 Common language: We have argued that migration networks which facilitate transition to 
the target country might not be confined to geographical proximity of the source country 
but could also originate from a shared language. The weighting matrix Common 
language gives equal weight to all other source countries which share a common 
language with a given source country. Since not the official but the actually spoken 
language matters, a dyad is classified as sharing a common language if it is spoken by at 
least nine percent of the population in both countries. Data is taken from the same source 
as distance. 
 Common colonial experience: The weighting matrix Common colonial experience gives 
equal weight to all source countries which share a common colonial experience in the 
sense of having been colonized at some point during the 20
th
 century by a specific 
destination country. Data is taken from Alesina and Dollar (2000). 
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The main theoretical argument for specific target contagion is that asylum seekers are deterred 
(attracted) by asylum policy becoming relatively more (less) restrictive in one destination 
country, which partly deflects (attracts) asylum flows onto (from) other destination countries. 
Since asylum policy change is the main causal mechanism for such negative externalities, an 
index is required to measure changes in the relative restrictiveness of target countries’ asylum 
policies. Such an index has been developed by Hatton (2009). Starting from a value of zero in 
1997 if no new asylum policy is implemented in this year, Hatton (2009) adds for each year the 
value of one for a major policy introduced on one of 15 dimensions that restricts asylum. In 
contrast, the value of one is deducted from the index in a given year for a major more liberal 
policy measure introduced on one of these 15 dimensions that makes asylum immigration easier. 
Of the 15 dimensions, 5 components each cover policies affecting the ability of asylum seekers 
to gain access to the target country’s territory, policies regarding the toughness of the process by 
which an applicant’s refugee status is determined, and policies affecting the welfare of asylum 
seekers during and after the processing of their asylum claim. ‘Access’ policies comprise visa 
restrictions, border controls, penalties for trafficking, imposing liabilities on carriers and the 
opportunity to apply for asylum from offshore; ‘processing’ policies relate to the definition of a 
refugee, the grounds for declaring certain applications as manifestly unfounded, the speed of 
processing, the granting of subsidiary status and the possibility for appeal against decisions; 
‘welfare’ policies cover detention, deportation, employment, access to benefits and family 
reunification policies. Coding is based on the annual International Migration Outlook reports of 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development as well as country reports of the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles and the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants.
5
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  See appendix 2 in Hatton (2009: F211-F212) and the supplementary appendix with country notes on 
changes in asylum policies in the earlier working paper version 
(http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/6278519.pdf) for full details on the coding. 
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If the theoretical argument for spatial dependence among destination countries is correct, asylum 
seekers should be directed to countries whose asylum policies become relatively more lenient 
and attracted from countries whose policies become relatively more restrictive, while countries 
with no relative change in their policies should not influence the number of applications in the 
target country under observation. In principle, these relative changes in asylum policy could 
simply be expressed by the difference in our measures of asylum policy changes between target j 
and target m; however, negative values in a weighting matrix should be avoided as they 
implicitly assume that the spatial dependence effect stemming from targets that have become 
relatively more restrictive is exactly the same as the effect from targets that have become 
relatively more liberal. Instead, two different weighting matrices are created as follows with both 
spatial effect variables estimated simultaneously: 
 Difference in asylum policy change (of targets that became relatively more restrictive) x 
Inverse distance: This weighting matrix consists of the product between the absolute 
difference in asylum policy change of targets which have become relatively more 
restrictive than target j and the inverse of squared distance (1/distance
2
) between target j 
and target m. The matrix is set to zero for all other destination countries. 
 Difference in asylum policy change (of targets that became relatively less restrictive) x 
Inverse distance: In contrast, this weighting matrix consists of the absolute difference in 
asylum policy change of targets which have become relatively less restrictive than target j 
multiplied by the inverse of squared distance (1/distance
2
) between target j and target m. 
Consequently, the matrix is set to zero for all other destination countries.  
These spatial weights are temporally lagged by one period given it takes time until potential 
asylum migrants learn about changes in relative asylum policy restrictiveness across target 
countries. 
18 
Within-dyad network effects 
As our measure for within-dyad network effects, we use data on the stock of the refugee 
population from source country i residing in target country j. The refugee population 
encompasses past asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status or who have been 
allowed to remain for humanitarian or other reasons as well as any other refugees who fall under 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and have been given leave to remain. 
Data is provided by UNHCR (2011) and, for data before 2000, the agency’s Statistical 
Yearbooks. 
Model specification and estimation technique 
The main challenge when estimating a spatial autoregressive model is to establish a causal 
relationship between the spatial lag and the dependent variable. A statistically significant 
coefficient of a spatial lag variable does not necessarily indicate such causality, but could solely 
represent spatial clustering or unobserved spatial heterogeneity, common shocks or common 
trends and observation-specific dynamics which confound the effect of spatial dependence – a 
problem known as Galton’s problem. It could also be driven by spatial dependence in the 
determinants of asylum emigration, for example, if a driver of outward migration in a source 
country (like political unrest) spills-over into neighbouring source countries. We are least 
concerned about this latter effect since we are agnostic whether apparent spatial dependence in 
asylum emigration is truly spatial dependence in asylum emigration or the consequence of spatial 
dependence in some of the determinants that result in asylum emigration from source countries. 
In the context of asylum migration, spatial clustering could occur if geographically close source 
countries share common characteristics or impacts, e.g. political unrest in the whole region, a 
drought affecting more than one country, which lead to similarly high levels of asylum seekers of 
different source countries. Unobserved spatial heterogeneity occurs for example if cultural 
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rootedness and the willingness to abandon one’s country are unobservable and similar across 
adjacent source countries. Similarly, on the destination country side, unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity exists if groups of destination countries share certain characteristics which are 
attractive for asylum seekers such as the reputation of being a lenient destination country that are 
difficult or impossible to observe. Spatial clustering in target countries occurs if a group of 
countries harmonise their asylum policy, as EU members have repeatedly tried to do with at best 
mixed success (Van Selm-Thorburn 1998; Thielemann 2004; Hatton 2005). 
To mitigate the problem of unobserved spatial heterogeneity and spatial clustering, we include 
dyad fixed effects, which automatically control for dyad-specific time-invariant factors. For the 
spatial lag variables, this has the advantage that also all time-invariant spatial clustering and 
unobserved spatial heterogeneity in levels is eliminated. As a consequence, not high numbers of, 
for example, asylum seekers from geographically proximate other source countries to the same 
destination country can lead to a positive coefficient of the spatial lag, but only increases (or 
decreases) in the number of asylum seekers from close source countries in the same target 
country, which is a stronger prerequisite. Admittedly, the effect on asylum flows generated by 
the spatial clustering of policy changes such as in the multilateral policy co-ordination among 
EU members is not captured by the dyad fixed effects. However, note that we analyze spatial 
dependence in asylum flows not in asylum policies. Policies enter our spatial lags as link 
variables for the weighting matrices and our weights for the spatial lags refer to differences in the 
changes in asylum policies which are unaffected among EU members if they all ratchet up their 
policies in the same direction. 
In addition to dyad fixed effects, source- and destination-country specific year fixed effects are 
added, which control fully flexibly for any temporal changes in the total number of asylum 
seekers that are specific to a country of origin or specific to a target country. These source- and 
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destination-country specific year fixed effects account for fundamental differences in the 
variation of the number of asylum emigrants and immigrants across countries over time. They 
also effectively control for general country-specific trends in the size of asylum migration; for 
instance, if over time more people have learnt about the possibility to seek asylum abroad, 
transportation has become cheaper or simply if changes in reporting standards have occurred. 
Importantly, inclusion of these source- and destination-country specific year fixed effects also 
means that we do not need to include any source- or destination-specific determinants of asylum 
migration – such as, for example, political regime type, human rights violations or the economic 
situation in either source or target country – as control variables since these would be perfectly 
collinear with the source-/destination-specific year fixed effects. This represents a major 
advantage of our research design since these source-specific drivers of asylum emigration and 
target-specific determinants of asylum immigration are difficult to measure.
6
 The only control 
variables one needs to consider for potential inclusion are those that vary across both time and 
dyads.  Of these, the dependency of a source country i on aid from target country j represents a 
useful control variable since potential asylum flows may map onto such aid dependency 
relationships. We measure aid dependency by the share that the donor (target) country j has 
among total aid received by the recipient (source) country i. Data are taken from the Project-level 
aid database (http://plaid.byu.edu/). 
A further implication of including destination-specific year fixed effects is that our spatial lag 
variables that model spatial dependence among target countries should capture pure deflection or 
                                                          
6
 The source- and destination-country specific year fixed effects will also absorb spatial dependence in 
such explanatory variables as long as such effects do not map onto specific dyads but merely increase the 
determinants of asylum emigration and immigration in target and source countries in general coming from 
all source countries and directed to all target countries, respectively.  
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spill-over effects of changes in the asylum policies in other target countries becoming stricter or 
laxer over time relative to the target country under observation. The decrease or increase in the 
asylum inflows from all source countries that stem from such changes in the restrictiveness of 
asylum policies in a given destination country going beyond such deflection or spill-over effects 
will be captured by these destination-specific year fixed effects.  
Formally, the estimated model is  
1ik jmt ij it jt ijtijt ijt kjt imt ijt
k i m j
y Refstock y y Aiddependency     
 
         , 
where
ijty is the natural log of asylum flows from source country i to target country j, ijtRefstock  
is the natural log of the existing stock of refugees from source i in country j, capturing within-
dyad network effects, ik kjt
k i
y

  models spatial dependence among source countries, 
1jmt imt
m j
y 

  models spatial dependence among target countries, ijtAiddependency  is a measure 
of the significance of target country j as a donor of aid to source country i, ij  capture dyad fixed 
effects, it  represent source-specific year fixed effects, jt  represent target-specific year fixed 
effects and ijt  is an idiosyncratic error term.  
Spatial autoregressive models such as ours introduce some endogeneity due to the presence of 
spatial lags in the estimation models. Tackling this endogeneity would require a complicated 
spatial maximum likelihood or spatial instrumental variable model (Lee and Yu 2010), which 
would be extremely difficult given the very large number of fixed effects. However, if the true 
degree of spatial dependence is relatively small, then Monte Carlo analysis undertaken by 
Franzese and Hays (2007) suggests that the bias of using ordinary least squares (OLS) is small. 
That the estimated coefficients presented in the next section suggest that, with one exception, 
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spatial dependence is small supports our use of OLS. Note, however, it is possible that the 
coefficients only suggest small spatial dependence due to large OLS bias. Use of OLS may thus 
result in an over-estimate of the degrees of spatial dependence. 
4. Results 
Table 1 displays the estimation results. Because the specific source contagion spatial lag 
variables employ weights that are correlated with each other, we include them first separately 
into the estimations in models I to III and then together in model IV. Focusing first on within-
dyad network effects, perhaps surprisingly the estimated strength of such effects is substantively 
small: a ten per cent increase in the existing stock of refugees from source country i in 
destination country j is estimated to increase contemporaneous asylum migration in this dyad by 
around 0.4 per cent across the four models. This is much smaller than previous estimates from 
existing studies which have captured within-dyad network effects with the lagged dependent 
variable (Author). However, the lagged dependent variable is a poor measure of such within-
dyad network effects and previous studies ignored spatial dependence.
7
  
Turning to spatial dependence among source countries next, it can be seen that the inverse 
distance weighted spatial lag variable is statistically significant with the expected positive sign in 
both models I and IV.  The spatial lag variable that uses common language as the weight among 
source countries is statistically significant in models II and IV, whereas there is no evidence for 
statistically significant spatial dependence among source countries which share the same 
previous experience of having been colonized by the same target country. The estimated degree 
of spatial dependence among source countries that share a common language is about three times 
                                                          
7
  We are grateful to an anonymous referee for having suggested using refugee stocks instead of temporal lags 
of the dependent variable as a measure of within-dyad network effects. Without the spatial lags included in the 
estimation model, the estimated coefficient of the within-dyad refugee stock variable increases to 0.7 (results not 
shown in table 1). 
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larger if this spatial lag variable is entered without the other specific source contagion spatial lag 
variables, whereas the coefficients for the spatial lag variable that employs the inverse of 
distance squared as weight are hardly affected by including the other two specific source 
contagion spatial lag variables. Focussing on model IV, which includes all specific source 
contagion spatial lag variables simultaneously, a ten per cent increase of asylum seekers from 
other source countries k that shares a spoken language with source country i to a specific 
destination country j is estimated to increase the flow of asylum seekers from source country i to 
this same destination country j by around 0.7 per cent, which is very modest. By contrast, the 
estimated degree of spatial dependence among source countries that are geographically 
proximate is much stronger: a ten per cent increase of asylum seekers from other geographically 
proximate source countries k to a specific destination country j is estimated to increase the flow 
of asylum seekers from source country i to this same destination country j by 4.4 per cent. 
With respect to the spatial lag variables capturing spatial dependence among target countries, the 
estimated coefficients of both target contagion spatial lag variables have the expected negative 
signs and are statistically significant in all models. The degree of spatial dependence appears to 
be small, however. A ten per cent decrease in the number of applications from a source country 
in geographically proximate targets that have become relatively more restrictive in their asylum 
policies in the previous year is estimated to increase by between 0.23 and 0.26 per cent the 
number of asylum applications from this source country in the target country j under observation. 
Similarly, a ten percent increase in the number of applicants from a country of origin to 
geographically proximate targets that have become relatively more liberal in their asylum 
policies in the previous year leads to a decrease of between 0.61 and 0.69 per cent in the number 
of asylum applications from this source country in the target country j under observation. This 
provides evidence that asylum policies becoming relatively more or less restrictive in 
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geographically proximate target countries create spill-over or deflection effects and that the spill-
over effect is somewhat stronger for asylum policies becoming relatively less restrictive 
(compared to policies becoming more restrictive) – but the main result is that the size of the 
externality is small in either case. This is consistent with expectations since the general increase 
(decrease) in asylum migrants from all source countries following such changes in asylum 
policies are already captured by the destination-specific year effects, meaning that the spatial lag 
variables capture pure deflection or spill-over effects, which should be small. 
Lastly, turning to the dyadic control variable, which measures the dependency of source country 
i on aid from destination country j, whilst as expected its coefficients are estimated with a 
positive sign in all models, the coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero at p<0.05. 
This is likely to be a consequence of our research design: Most of the variation in aid 
dependency is across dyads and our dyad fixed effects eliminate all cross-dyad variation. 
5. Conclusion  
We argued in this paper that asylum migrant network effects go beyond the country that asylum 
migrants come from. Such positive externalities potentially create positive spatial dependence 
among geographically close as well as linguistically similar source countries as well as source 
countries that share a common colonial experience in the sense of having previously been 
colonized by the same destination country. We also argued that asylum policies that become 
relatively more restrictive create negative externalities among destination countries, as some 
asylum seekers are deflected by asylum policies becoming relatively more restrictive in one 
destination country and incentivised to lodge their application in other geographically proximate 
destination countries whose asylum policies become relatively less restrictive. These 
externalities create negative spatial dependence among target countries. 
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The results corroborate the existence of both specific source and specific target contagion. As 
expected, the number of asylum seekers from a source country to a specific target country 
increases with the size of migration flows from geographically close other source countries. We 
also found evidence that these network effects extend to migrants from other source countries in 
which the same language is spoken, but the effect is substantively small. By contrast, we found 
no statistically significant evidence that these network effects extend to migrants from other 
source countries that shared the same previous colonial experience with the source country under 
observation. One potential explanation is that similar place of origin and shared identity from 
geographically proximate source countries trump shared language which may be spoken by other 
migrants from far away places with whom potential asylum migrants have little in common bar 
the same language. They would also trump shared previous colonial experience that again 
typically links rather heterogeneous source countries whose geographical location varies largely 
(at least for France and the UK who had colonies all over the world). Another potential 
explanation is that people smuggling networks may draw in potential asylum migrants from 
geographically proximate source countries. In other words, the evidence for the substantively 
large degree of spatial dependence among geographically proximate source countries may reflect 
both social network and people smuggling network effects cutting across the borders of 
geographically proximate source countries. 
The estimation results also suggest the existence of specific target contagion since a decrease in 
the number of asylum seekers in other geographically proximate destination countries with 
policies that have become relatively stricter in the previous year is associated with an increase in 
the number of applications in a given target country and vice versa for geographically proximate 
destinations with policies that have become relatively more liberal. This lends support to the 
hypothesis that asylum policies that become relatively stricter generate negative externalities 
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onto geographically proximate destination countries. However, we found the degree of spatial 
dependence among target countries to be small. 
Both findings have important policy implications: Hatton (2004) argues that the time-
dependency in asylum flows coming from specific source countries created by dyad-specific 
network effects limits the effectiveness of asylum policies to reduce the number of asylum 
seekers. This is because the stock of asylum migrants who are already in the target country 
decreases the costs for subsequent migrants from the same source country. Our analysis shows 
that the same argument applies to migration from other geographically proximate source 
countries. The migrant network effects are therefore stronger than conventionally believed, 
cutting also across national boundaries toward geographically proximate source countries and, if 
to a lesser extent, source countries that speak the same language. Whilst we are not at all 
advocating policies aimed at reducing the number of asylum migrants, these hysteresis effects do 
sharpen the issues involved in burden sharing debates among destination countries (Thielemann 
2006b). Simply put, once a destination country has become popular among asylum seekers from 
certain source countries it is likely to remain so for some time due to network effects that, as our 
analysis shows, even go beyond the country of origin of migrants. 
As a consequence of “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies among target countries, all else equal 
governments have an incentive to engage in a race-to-the-bottom and lower the standards until 
they run into severe conflicts with a nation’s obligations under human rights treaties such as the 
Geneva Convention (Author). Whilst our results suggest that the degree of spatial dependence 
among target countries and thus the degree of negative externality created by tightening one’s 
asylum policy relative to other geographically proximate destination countries is relatively small, 
it is not zero either. The standard economic solution to negative externalities is co-operative 
action to overcome the incentive to free-ride on other countries’ willingness to provide 
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protection to asylum seekers. This externality thus provides further reason for policy 
harmonisation and common standards in asylum policy, so that not only a minimum treatment to 
refugees is guaranteed, but also the negative impact of one destination country’s actions onto 
other countries is limited.  
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Figure 1. Total number of asylum applications in industrialised countries 1980-2009 (in 
Thousands) 
 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for a list of target countries in the estimation sample; Data source: UNHCR (2011). 
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Table 1. Estimation results. 
Model: I II III IV 
Refugee stock  0.0398** 0.0434** 0.0464** 0.0395** 
 (0.00927) (0.00935) (0.00939) (0.00926) 
Specific source contagion:     
   W: Inverse distance
2
 0.463**   0.443** 
 (0.0260)   (0.0274) 
   W: Common language  0.205**  0.0686* 
  (0.0272)  (0.0269) 
   W: Common colonial history with target   -0.417 -0.442 
   (0.674) (0.652) 
Specific target contagion:     
W: Difference in asylum policy change (of targets that  -0.0267* -0.0237* -0.0229* -0.0261* 
      became relatively more restrictive) x inverse distance
2
 (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0107) 
W: Difference in asylum policy change (of targets that  -0.0610** -0.0673** -0.0692** -0.0609** 
      became relatively less restrictive) x inverse distance
2
 (0.00773) (0.00788) (0.00795) (0.00772) 
     
Aid dependency  0.00878 0.00911 0.00884 0.00880 
 (0.00494) (0.00499) (0.00492) (0.00496) 
     
R-squared 0.343 0.314 0.307 0.344 
Observations 29,070 29,070 29,070 29,070 
Number of dyads 2,907 2,907 2,907 2,907 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of asylum applicants (plus one) from source country i to destination country j in year t. W: denotes 
the weighting matrix used for calculating the spatial lags; standard errors clustered on dyads in parentheses; all estimations contain dyad 
fixed effects and destination-/source-specific year fixed effects;   
* statistically significant at p<0.05; ** at p<0.01. 
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Appendix 1. List of target countries and first year of detailed data availability 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
 
Appendix 2. List of source countries 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Republic of Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Former Yugoslavia (Serbia, 
Montenegro, Kosovo), Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Korea, Republic 
of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, Republic of Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
